PROCEEDINGS 1 2 MS. RUCKI: Hi Everyone. This is Molly. 3 I am going to start checking folks in using 4 first names if that's easier. Starting with the Plaintiff and for Cuyahoga 5 6 County, we do have Hunter? 7 (No response.) 8 MS. RUCKI: Salvatore? 9 MR. BADALA: Yes. Good afternoon. 10 MS. RUCKI: Frank? 11 MR. GALLUCCI: Yes. Yes, good afternoon. 12 MS. RUCKI: Brendan. 13 (No response.) 14 MS. RUCKI: Greg? Do we have Deborah from 15 Summit? Or Linda? 16 MS. SINGER: Linda is here. MS. RUCKI: Donald? Do we have Mark? All 17 18 right. 19 For Defendants, Walgreens first. 20 MR. SHKOLNIK: I'm sorry, Hunter Shkolnik is 21 here. I didn't hear. 22 MS. RUCKI: Okay. Thanks. 23 MR. WEINBERGER: And Pete Weinberger is on. MR. MIGLIORI: And Don Migliori for Summit. 24 25 MR. RICE: And Joe Rice is on.

1	MS. RUCKI: Okay.
2	MR. FARRELL: And Paul Farrell.
3	MR. LANTER: And Mark Lanier and Paul
4	Stanley.
5	MR. RAFFERTY: And Troy Rafferty.
6	MS. RUCKI: All right. Back to Defendants.
7	Kaspar.
8	MR. STOFFELMAYR: Yes, I am on.
9	MS. RUCKI: Michael Freeman?
10	MR. FREEMAN: Here.
11	MS. SWIFT: And Kate Swift is on as well. I
12	didn't hear you call my name. Apologies.
13	MS. RUCKI: For CVS, we have Eric?
14	MR. DELINSKY: Yes, I'm here. Sasha.
15	MS. MILLER: Yes, I'm here.
16	MS. RUCKI: Graeme.
17	MR. BUSH: Here.
18	THE COURT: All right. Dan Polster calling
19	in.
20	MS. RUCKI: Hi, Judge. I am just checking
21	everyone in to make sure everyone is here.
22	From CVS, we have Elizabeth?
23	MS. FERGUSON: Yes, I'm sorry.
24	MS. RUCKI: Giant Eagle, Robert?
25	MR. BARNES: Here.

1	MS. RUCKI: Josh?
2	(No response).
3	MS. RUCKI: Do we have David Ross.
4	MR. ROSS: Yes, I'm here.
5	MS. RUCKI: Drug Mart, Tim and Tom?
6	MR. McCONNELL: Tom is here.
7	MR. JOHNSON: I'm here.
8	MS. RUCKI: For Rite Aid, we have Kelly.
9	MS. MOORE: Yes.
10	MS. RUCKI: John Lavelle.
11	MR. LaVELLE: John Lavelle is here, yes.
12	MS. RUCKI: Greg.
13	MR. FOUTS: Yes, here.
14	MS. RUCKI: Ron.
15	MR. CHIMA: Yes, here.
16	MS. RUCKI: Okay. For Wal-Mart, we have
17	Tina.
18	MS. TABACCHI: Yes.
19	MS. RUCKI: Tara.
20	MS. FUMERION: Yes.
21	MS. RUCKI: And Kerri.
22	MS. RUITENBERG: Yes.
23	MS. RUCKI: Do we have the court reporter?
24	COURT REPORTER: Yes, I'm here. George.
25	MS. RUCKI: Okay.
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1 MS. MATZ: Deb Matz. 2 MS. RUCKI: Thank you. 3 MR. KORBIN: Josh Korbin. 4 MS. RUCKI: David Cohen, are you there? 5 (Pause.) 6 SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: Hi, Molly. Sorry, I 7 am here. 8 MS. RUCKI: Great. All right, Judge, seems 9 like we have everyone. 10 THE COURT: All right. Is Judge Ruiz on? 11 MS. RUCKI: Yes, he is here. 12 MAGISTRATE JUDGE RUIZ: Yes, I am. 13 THE COURT: All right. This is MDL 2804, 14 the opioid MDL, particularly the case against the 15 pharmacies, Track 1B. 16 The Court has reviewed the various filings 17 that have come in over the last few days. I want to say 18 this at the outset: It was my plan and intent to have 19 one pharmacy bellwether trial. 20 It makes sense to the MDL Judge to be the 21 one who conducts the first bellwether trial. I had set 22 one for the pharmacies, Track 1B, Summit and Cuyahoga 23 County as the Plaintiffs. 24 I knew it was somewhat unusual to allow 25 complaints to be amended to add dispensing claims, but I

thought it was far more efficient for the Plaintiffs, certainly the Defendants, and the Court to have one bellwether case against the pharmacies, having all of the claims, distributing claims and dispensing claims.

Pharmacies filed a Mandamus action that the Court of Appeals ruled that it was wrong for me to allow the belated -- amending the claims to add -- amending the complaints to add the dispensing claims.

But the pharmacies should have realized that what they were doing was giving that decision to the Plaintiffs, whether or not to go forward with Track 1B with the distribution claims alone or to just drop the distribution claims and ask the Court to set a bellwether trial with everything. Plaintiff opted to go forward with the distribution claims alone.

So that's what we are going to try in November, but the pharmacies should have realized that I was going to set a bellwether case involving the dispensing claims, and I can only set a bellwether case in the Northern District of Ohio.

So that's why I suggested that the parties confer and see if they could come up with one.

The Plaintiff had suggested Lake County and Trumbull County, counties. They seemed as good as any to me, but I don't really care. If the Defendants thought

that some other counties in the Northern District would be better, I would certainly listen to them.

The Defendants had suggested a county in Georgia, and they are not waiving Lexicon, so obviously, I couldn't do that. I can't try a case in Georgia without the parties' consent. I can only try a case in the Northern District of Ohio.

So we will just try Trumbull County and Lake County, and the Defendants objected to my structuring the case. I didn't structure the case. The case was already structured against the pharmacies and public nuisance alone.

So I said, well, we will do the same thing. So that's what we will do. We will end up with two bellwether trials. November of 2020 will be the distribution claims alone, Plaintiff Summit County, Cuyahoga County, and in May of 2021, we will have Lake County and Trumbull counties against the same pharmacies, and we will have distribution claims and dispensing claims.

So I am going to direct the parties to meet and confer and come up with a litigating schedule. You can use the model of Track 1B, which I had given people a year in advance to do, so you can pretty much plug in the dates. We will have a four-week trial in May of 2021

unless, of course, the parties use the opportunity between now and then to work out some settlement, which I have encouraged, and while we are on that subject, have you had any conversation with the private mediator that you selected? I am not asking for any details. I just want to know whether you met with him virtually.

MR. STOFFELMAYR: Judge, it is Kaspar
Stoffelmayr for the Defendants, and the parties have met
with Judge Gandhi, both together and independently at
this point a number of times.

THE COURT: Okay, good. Again, I just want to make sure you were underway. Judge Gandhi has an excellent reputation. I think if all sides really want to reach a settlement, you can do it under his direction.

Okay. Now, we have to figure out Track 1B, and I have read the parties' filings. It is not — the Court isn't going to decide how the Plaintiffs try their case or the Defendants try their case, but how you respectively try your case will influence what documents are admissible.

Let me start out with the Plaintiffs. All right. This is distribution claims only. How will you — how are you trying your case? What's your evidence going to be?

MR. WEINBERGER: Your Honor, this is Pete Weinberger for the Plaintiffs.

The distribution case will be tried principally on whether or not the Defendants had adequate SOM systems in place, and with respect to the SOM systems they did have in place, whether or not they correctly used them or in total whether or not they violated the Controlled Substances Act by failing to properly use systems that should have identified suspicious orders and halt that shipment.

Now, unlike the Big Three distribution case, these pharmacy Defendants as both distributors and retail dispensers had — were able to see from the dispensing side how a particular store or in what quantities or in what — and what methodology they were dispensing these opioids, what we have commonly now referred to as a red-flag system.

And so in order to make decisions about the quantities of opioids to distribute to their own stores, we believe that they had an obligation, indeed, a duty to look at what were the dispensing practices or levels of opioids being dispensed at the store level.

And so it was our belief and going back to a year-and-a-half ago that dispensing policies and potentially dispensing data, that they would have had

available to look at at the time they were making decisions to distribute to themselves, was important, and it is important to this case.

Now, having said that, as you know, your Honor, we took — we have taken the position that if the Defendants' position is that dispensing information and policies are not relevant to their obligations as distributors and are prepared not to utilize dispensing policies or data to defend themselves, then we are prepared to try the case as if they were simply a distributors case and not a pharmacy distributor, who also had obligations as dispensers. So let me just stop there.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WEINBERGER: And before I conclude, if any member of my team, our team who is on this call, wants to add anything, I am happy to stop and let them add.

MR. SHKOLNIK: Nothing from Cuyahoga.

MR. MIGLIORI: It was well said.

MR. FARRELL: This is Paul Farrell. The only thing I would add is the actual data from the pharmacies that CVS, for instance, was distributing, the data that is available theoretically could be a component of the due diligence file.

And so Pete's point is an emphasis for us
that if we are going to draw a line, then what's good for
the goose is good for the gander.

THE COURT: Well, obviously. But Paul, that data was produced last year in 2019 as part of an issue of discovery for Track 1B when it was just distribution claims against the pharmacies, correct?

MR. WEINBERGER: Your Honor, this is Pete.
No, not completely.

There were dispensing policies that were produced, and there were reports of due diligence that were produced. So what I am saying is compilations, but the data itself, we never had the data, the prescription data, dispensing data until it was produced about six weeks ago.

THE COURT: All right. And we only had that because we were at that time proceeding as Track 1B having distribution and dispensing claims.

MR. WEINBERGER: That is true, your Honor.

And I believe in a discovery order from Special Master Cohen, which is discovery order 8, he made a decision on portionality and was looking also at the timing of the discovery schedule and ruled that at that time, that we could not get — we could get the policies, and we could get due diligence files, but we couldn't get

the dispensing data, but that the Defendants had an obligation to preserve the data, and that the data might become available to us in discovery post CT 1A.

THE COURT: All right. How are the Defendants planning to defend this case in November?

MR. DELINSKY: Good afternoon, your Honor.

It is Eric Delinsky on behalf of CVS, and I will speak
for the pharmacy Defendants on this issue.

The short answer to your question is that we are going to defend our respective clients at trial based on the discovery record as it existed at the time we were severed. That may require a little explanation, your Honor, but I think the parties were generally severed.

Most of us were severed in and around August of 2019 prior to the Track 1A trial in October, and Walgreens, of course, was severed right after the settlement was reached after jury was selected before opening statements.

And we are going to use the discovery record as it existed at the time of the severance to defend our clients. That will include witnesses on the distribution side of our respective businesses, expert witnesses, third-party witnesses, of course, witnesses Plaintiff -- representatives of the Plaintiffs.

And to a degree, your Honor, it also will include some what we can call dispensing-related information.

And just to step back, as Pete referenced a year-and-a-half ago in October of 2018, we have been at this that long, Special Master Cohen addressed the question about what degree of dispensing information is appropriate for a distribution only case, specifically in the context of Track 1A.

And Special Master Cohen determined that it was appropriate, indeed, necessary that the pharmacy Defendants produce several buckets of dispensing information.

So for instance, we were ordered to produce, and we did produce dispensing data contained in our SOM due diligence file. That was produced. We were ordered to produce, and we did produce our dispensing policies and procedures.

We were ordered to produce, and we did produce 30(b)(6) witnesses able to testify on dispensing policies and procedures.

We were ordered to produce, and we did produce compensation policies for our pharmacists. We, of course, produced all the orders that our pharmacists placed to our distribution center.

Your Honor, we call that distribution data, but what that distribution data encapsulates are our orders placed by our pharmacies that the distribution centers fulfill. That was produced in the case.

And as we went down this course in Track 1A in the distribution case and in the wake of discovery ruling No. 8 entered by Special Master Cohen, many of us also disclosed witnesses who could testify about the policies and procedures and pharmacists who could testify about relevant issues.

All that discovery, your Honor, was provided long ago, twelve months ago, eighteen months ago, all in the context of Track 1A, all in service of Special Master Cohen's order, all in service of the Track 1A distribution trial.

And had we gone to trial, had we not been severed, that evidence would be available to Plaintiff. It would be available to us. And our position is that's where we are today, just as we were at the time of severance, and that that same status quo should pertain.

To the extent Plaintiffs object or the concern that we may use an entirely new bucket of discovery that was produced since the amendments by interlineation since Track 1B commenced over the course of the last several months, we are not going to use that

information.

We agree with Plaintiff that that information, which includes prescription-by-prescription dispensing data, is not available for use in this case. But we do -- our position is that all the discovery material and disclosures made in the course of the Track 1A distribution case should be available to us, is available to Plaintiff. Plaintiffs state in their position paper that they believe it is available to them, and certainly, if it is available to them, it is available to us, too.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I think everyone agrees with that, Mr. Delinsky. If it was produced last year and would have been used in the trial, 1A, it is available for 1B.

MR. WEINBERGER: Your Honor, this is Pete.

Can I respond for a moment?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WEINBERGER: So in the leadup to the trial, Walgreens for one identified a number of pharmacists who they indicated they were going to call as witnesses, who had not been deposed.

So the context in which Mr. Delinsky talks about orders by the pharmacists that they are going to put into evidence orders by a pharmacist from a

particular store to the CVS distribution center using CVS as an example, presumably per their policies — and frankly, per the testimony of witnesses that were deposed — that pharmacist had an obligation to look at the dispensing data to identify whether or not there were prescriptions that potentially raised red flags in order to properly place the orders for drugs to be distributed to the local pharmacy.

So you can't separate what Mr. Delinsky describes as distribution data, which he described as the order by the pharmacist as distribution data, and separate out the fact that what the pharmacist had to be relying on or should have been relying on was information at the store level in terms of how and to what extent these opioids were being dispensed.

And you know clearly we did not have the data; we had what they describe as due diligence files looking at the data.

Well, until we got the data, we were unable to test whether or not the due diligence files were complete. So they can — what I'm hearing Mr. Delinsky say is, well, we produced the due diligence files, which is a compilation of the data that a pharmacist may have looked at to justify an order of distribution to that store, but we are unable to test whether or not that due

diligence was done appropriately, and that's, frankly, 1 2 your Honor, where the rubber meets the road here. 3 THE COURT: All right. Look, Mr. Delinsky, 4 are you planning to call individual pharmacists to 5 testify, and if so, what are they going to say? What is 6 the purpose of their testimony? 7 MR. DELINSKY: We may call pharmacists, your 8 Honor, and their testimony would be limited to the 9 material that has been the subject of discovery in 10 It would be about ordering, placing orders to Track 1A. 11 wholesale pharmacies. It would be about the policies 12 that have been produced, all of which were produced long 13 ago in Track 1A. 14 THE COURT: Well, what about -- I mean, is a 15 given pharmacist really going to say that he didn't look 16 at his own dispensing data and records in deciding how 17 much to order? 18 MR. DELINSKY: Your Honor, what 19 Mr. Weinberger has raised frankly is, you know, are 20 fact accusations that aren't supported. There isn't a 21 problem --22 I would like -- can you answer THE COURT: 23 my question? 24 All right. You call a pharmacist to testify 25 about wholesale orders, orders, policies, et cetera.

he going to say that he placed -- he or she -- placed orders without examining his own dispensing records?

MR. DELINSKY: Your Honor, in the context of dispensing records, it can really be broken down in two ways: There is inventory and what is an appropriate till, appropriate quantity of a particular medicine to maintain on the shelf, so it is available to fill prescriptions for patients who need them. That's one way of looking at the data.

The other is what is posited by

Mr. Weinberger, that pharmacists in Plaintiffs' view

would undertake some, quote unquote, red flag review of
the prescriptions in the course of placing their orders.

We do not plan to present evidence of the latter nor do
we think, frankly, that's a legal requirement in any
respect.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. WEINBERGER: Your Honor, I can't just sit silently.

I mean, this is splitting hairs, inappropriately splitting hairs when, in fact, we have -- we should have the right to -- I mean, the crux of the retail pharmacy distribution case is whether or not the orders that were placed and then tilled was done

appropriately and in accordance with suspicious order monitoring, and the only way to test that is frankly to test whether or not the ordering employee exercised due diligence at the dispensing level.

Very frankly, it is not that different than our case against the Big Three because the Big Three also produced information that they were — and questionnaires — that they were issuing to a retail pharmacy like CVS when one of them was distributing an opioid to them, because they wanted to know what was the reason for the additional, let's say, thousand-pill quantity than the month before. And so CVS had to produce information as to why it was that they ordered more.

MR. DELINSKY: Your Honor, if I can --

THE COURT: This is exactly why I only wanted one trial because it has always been clear to me that for a pharmacy — that their distribution policies are inextricably intertwined with your dispensing policies and practices, because you are only distributing to yourself, all right, as opposed to the Big Three distributors who distribute to — they are not distributing to themselves; they are distributing to other entities.

You are only distributing to yourself. I am talking of the pharmacy. So I always questioned what was

the real difference between the dispensing claim and a distribution claim, and that ultimately when we had this combined trial, I really thought it would focus on the dispensing claim.

The red flags would be red flags that come up in dispensing from, you know, say a given patient, a given customer gets four prescriptions for opioids from four different CVS stores in the same month.

And candidly, I don't know how we are going to try the distribution claim only case. I can't tell the Plaintiffs how to do it; I can't tell the Defendants not to call pharmacists, but quess what?

You call the pharmacist at 55th and Euclid, I don't see how I can allow that without ordering you to produce the dispensing records for the 55th and Euclid pharmacy, so the Plaintiff can test the credibility of the statements the pharmacist is making.

Now, if we don't have any pharmacists testifying, maybe not, but I don't -- you know, I don't -- unless someone can clearly tell me how a distribution claim against a pharmacy is separate and distinct from a dispensing claim -- we are talking about whether or not they caused a public nuisance -- I don't see how we break -- how we have a distribution practice case only.

MR. DELINSKY: Your Honor, the solution to

your dilemma would be to put Track 1B back in the MDL -- back in the bucket of state cases and to proceed with another bellwether that has bells. That is the solution, the dilemma you outlined.

But if we are not going to do that, I do
think it is important to direct your attention to a few
of the facts we are dealing with and some of the
ramifications. We began disclosing pharmacists as
potential witnesses with relevant information in Track 1A
going back two years, June of 2018 as a category.

And we progressively got more granular providing names. This is all in Track 1A. Never were these issues raised with the exception of the litigation before Special Master Cohen where he ruled on the issues. Now well on the case, he struck the balance. That's the balance that we have to live with in this case now. It is the balance that does not fall to sensing data.

THE COURT: Look, I don't see how we try
this case in November on distribution only without it
morphing into dispensing on both sides. And I am not
going to tie -- I am going to have the same ground rules
for both, but can someone tell me -- how can a pharmacy
-- can you have a suspicious order monitoring system that
doesn't look at dispensing data? Is that possible when
all you are doing is distributing to yourself?

That's my question.

MR. DELINSKY: Absolutely, your Honor.

THE COURT: How? All right. How can your SOM -- how can your SOM not require someone to look at the dispensing practices of your pharmacies.

MR. DELINSKY: The answer is provided in the regulation. The SOM regulation calls upon the registrant, in this instance the distributor, to put in place a system to identify suspicious orders defined to be orders of unusual size, orders of unusual frequency or orders of an unusual pattern.

It is an order-based analysis. That's what the statute calls for, and that's how a SOM system can be run without reference to dispensing data, and indeed, that's often how it is run when you are not dealing with self-distributors; you are dealing with wholesale distributors; don't have their own pharmacies; shipping to other pharmacies, and they don't always and frequently don't have the dispensing data.

That's not to say it is not used. It hasn't been used where it is in the due diligence file. We have all produced it, but that's the answer to your question. It is an order-based analysis.

The regulations require an evaluation based on the size, pattern, frequency of the order. It does

not call on the registrant to go to the dispensing 1 2 data. 3 THE COURT: Well, let me follow up on that. 4 If the SOM is supposed to -- what we 5 will call red flags of orders, unusual size, frequency, 6 or pattern, so if you get an order that seems of unusual 7 size, frequency, or pattern -- again, this is from one of 8 your own stores -- then, you would be required to 9 exercise due diligence, go to the store, talk to the 10 people, ask them questions, and. 11 The questions and follow-up and due 12 diligence would almost certainly require probing the 13 dispensing practices of that store, right? 14 MR. DELINSKY: Possibly. But we have 15 produced the due diligence materials from our files. 16 to the extent that there was a resort to dispensing 17 information into the files, it has been produced. 18 MR. WEINBERGER: Your Honor, unless you have 19 another question --20 THE COURT: Well, let me keep going with 21 this. 22 MR. WEINBERGER: Okay. 23 THE COURT: Then why -- are the Plaintiffs 24 planning to call any pharmacists in your case in chief? 25 What I am saying, pharmacist employees of the Defendant.

1 MR. LANIER: Your Honor, Mark Lanier. 2 we are not. 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MR. DELINSKY: But your Honor, Plaintiffs 5 are calling experts who single out particular pharmacies 6 as suspicious. 7 THE COURT: Understood. But I am talking 8 about pharmacists who worked at Rite Aid, CVS, Walgreens, 9 Wal-Mart during the period, so the answer is no. All 10 right. 11 Then Mr. Delinsky, what are you planning to 12 have your pharmacists testify about? 13 MR. DELINSKY: Our pharmacists will testify 14 about particular circumstances relating to their pharmacy 15 that could explain large orders, for instance, if it is 16 next to a hospital. 17 Pharmacists can testify about why and how 18 they place orders. Pharmacists could testify about 19 policies and procedures produced in the case. 20 Pharmacists will not testify about the particular prescription. 21 22 So everything we would have our pharmacists 23 testify fit squarely within the four corners of the 24 discovery that was taken and completed in the Track 1A 25 distribution case.

And your Honor, if I could say one more word about that, it would not be appropriate -- it would not be permissible if Plaintiff were able to seek severance on their own initiative. We didn't ask for it. They sought it.

They discontinued the trial from last

October to this November, and it would not be permissible that the consequence of their voluntary act in seeking severance had the effect of reformulating and reforming discovery records.

All that is going to trial is the distribution case. The record in the distribution case is closed. And that's where we are. And there is no basis because of the failed amendment and their own decision to amend or their own decision to severe off for them to go back in time and re-do things that they --

a problem with individual pharmacists talking about how they placed orders, policies, and procedures. All right. But if they are getting into the circumstances of particular orders and why they placed certain orders and what they did and didn't do, I don't see how I can allow that without permitting the Plaintiff to get to dispensing data at the same time, during the same period

that is the subject of the testimony.

Again, I am not -- I'm not -- you are the one who said this is what you want these pharmacists to testify about, and I think -- the first thing, the first element you mentioned, I think, goes beyond prior discovery, opens the door to requiring the production of dispensing data.

And I don't want to go down that road. If we can clearly make this a SOM distribution claim case, we will try it in November. That's fine.

MR. DELINSKY: But your Honor, pharmacists don't consult dispensing data in placing orders, and they are not going to testify to that effect. They consult inventory data, but they don't do red flag analysis and consult dispensing data as it has become known in this case. It's just not how it works, and that's not what their testimony is going to be.

And Plaintiff, their core allegation from the time they amended us into the complaint in April of 2018 has been that pharmacists placed suspicious orders. It has always been an accusation against pharmacists, the core. It has always been in the case.

It has never been a mystery that pharmacists are witnesses about whether -- you know, why they placed orders and how. We are not going to delve into the

particulars of any orders. No pharmacist remembers that, 1 2 Judge. Remember we stopped --3 THE COURT: No. You said that particular 4 circumstances relating to a specific order like --5 MR. DELINSKY: No, I'm sorry. I am sorry, 6 your Honor. Let me -- I confused that. Let me restate 7 that. 8 Certain pharmacies are criticized for an 9 aggregate high volume, not one order or another. Okay. 10 But Plaintiffs' experts say pharmacy A is a high volume 11 pharmacy, and therefore, it is suspicious. 12 Well, if that pharmacy -- you know, we may 13 call a pharmacist to say "yeah, we have a high volume. 14 We are near four hospitals." 15 It is a matter of geography, not a matter 16 of specific orders. That's certainly fair game, 17 especially if Plaintiffs' experts are making the 18 accusations. 19 THE COURT: All right. 20 MR. LANIER: Your Honor, Mark Lanier. 21 could respond, please? 22 THE COURT: Yes. 23 MR. LANIER: This idea could only be brought 24 forward by the Defendants as Mr. Delinsky is suggesting 25 if it is part of the due diligence file. In other words,

the distributor has the responsibility of due diligence once a suspicious order has been identified.

So if they have got evidence that the distributor went to the pharmacy, did the due diligence, got the, quote unquote, testimony of the pharmacy that is going to be offered to the jury, that's one situation, but I think Mr. Delinsky is going to tell you that, as part of the due diligence, there is nothing in the file that indicates that there were records made of going to the pharmacy or doing the necessary research and finding out from the pharmacists this type of material.

So for him to put the witness on belies his entire argument of us being limited to suspicious order monitoring because he just stepped out of the due diligence rank and said I am not allowed to cross the guy on due diligence.

I am not allowed to say, "Okay. Maybe you are in the middle of four hospitals, but by the same token, these are prescriptions that were all being written by a gynecologist for men."

I mean, this isn't the kind of thing where he can have his cake and eat it, too.

THE COURT: Yeah, I agree with that,
Mr. Delinsky. Let me just put it this way:

I will do this distribution-only claim

trial, but I don't see how -- I don't see how it is relevant or should be admissible that you put on pharmacists.

The only way you put on a pharmacist is if somehow that pharmacist's testimony is relevant to the due diligence.

Now, if you want to corroborate that the corporation did call the pharmacist at 55th and Euclid, you can put him on and say "yes, they did contact me, and this is what I said," but to put in new testimony, I think you are merging into, you know, turning this into a dispensing case.

MR. DELINSKY: That is not true, your Honor.

That is not true. And what the Plaintiffs are doing,
your Honor, is they are walking the Court into error
again.

What they are saying is that everything about the case has to be evaluated by reference to their liability case, and that there is no other elements to the offense. There is not a causation element that is eligible for proof.

They are saying that they are allowed the present testimony singling out particular pharmacies, but we can't present counter evidence about those pharmacies. Okay.

1 They are saying that, no --2 THE COURT: You want to put on evidence from 3 your pharmacies, fine, but then you have got to give them 4 the record of those pharmacies. MR. DELINSKY: But your Honor -- and that is 5 6 -- they are asking for this data in complete and total 7 violation of the mandate of the Sixth Circuit. 8 Your Honor, we were prepared to go to trial 9 in October. Plaintiff had raised none of these issues, 10 not a one, other than as decided by Special Master Cohen 11 in discovery ruling No. 8. This is using -- what they 12 are doing now, your Honor, is they are using their 13 request for a severance in which they pledged to us that 14 severance would not prejudice us. 15 THE COURT: Let me ask you: Have all the 16 pharmacists that you designated as potential witnesses 17 been deposed? 18 MR. DELINSKY: No. Plaintiffs elected not 19 to try to depose them. 20 THE COURT: Well, they will be deposed now. 21 That's the only way I can determine what testimony I am 22 going to allow in the case. 23 MR. DELINSKY: Well, your Honor, that's just 24 giving them a re-do. That's reopening what has been

closed. They had the opportunity to take that position

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of the pharmacists. 1 2 We, as a matter of fact, put in a discovery 3 response two months ago in discovery where we for a 4 third time identified pharmacists as a category of 5 witnesses, and we told them, if you want a sampling of 6 names, tell us, and we will get them to you, and they 7 didn't respond. 8 THE COURT: How many pharmacists are you 9 planning to call? You have got four weeks. How many 10 pharmacists -- I mean, you may have designated, I don't 11 know, 50. How many are you really planning to call? 12 MR. DELINSKY: I believe we designated ten, 13 your Honor. 14 THE COURT: And designated --15 SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: I'm sorry, your 16 Honor. This is David. 17 Is that just your client or ten as amongst 18 all the pharmacy Defendants? 19 MR. DELINSKY: It is CVS, Special Master. 20 SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: So how many -- do you 21 know how many total?

MR. DELINSKY: I don't, I'm sorry.

THE COURT: That could be 60 pharmacists.

Obviously, Mr. Delinsky, we are not going to have 60 pharmacists testify. It is inconceivable. All right.

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It's the testimony by individual pharmacists that trouble 1 2 the Court as to how we draw a line between a distribution 3 case and a dispensing case. All right. And I --4 (At this point, Judge Polster's phone 5 connection was lost, and the following discussion was 6 held out of the presence of the Court:) 7 MR. FARRELL: Judge Polster, this is Paul 8 Farrell. Can I say one thing for the record? 9 MS. HUGHES: Sounds like he is not on, Paul. 10 MR. FARRELL: Well, it was going to be very 11 important. 12 MS. HUGHES: Well, fine. Just a minute, and 13 we will try to get him back. 14 (Long pause.) 15 SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: Mary, this is David. 16 Can you hear me? 17 Thank you for taking the lead during this 18 I just wanted to ask you because I don't 19 remember when it was that the pharmacy Defendants were 20 severed in Track 1A. 21 MR. DELINSKY: I think there were -- the 22 five of us were severed -- I don't know the exact 23 date --24 THE COURT: All right. This is Judge 25 Polster. I don't know what happened. Suddenly, I was

off. All right. 1 2 My question was: How long do the 3 pharmacists want to identify -- the pharmacist witnesses 4 you are really going to call and what they are going to 5 say, can it be done in two weeks? 6 MS. HUGHES: Can everybody hear the Judge 7 since he was disconnected? 8 THE COURT: Can you hear me? This isn't 9 working. What's going on? 10 SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: Your connection I am 11 sorry to say is not very clear, Judge. 12 THE COURT: Then, I quess we will have to do 13 this in person. I don't know. What --14 MS. HUGHES: Judge, why don't you hang up --15 THE COURT: I did, I did. I called back in. 16 I will do it one more time. 17 (Discussion continues out of the presence of 18 the Court as follows:) 19 SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: I will take up where 20 I left off, Eric. I didn't catch your answer. 21 MR. DELINSKY: Five of us were in August, 22 Special Master. I can pull up the exact date. I can say 23 it was around August 15th, 16th. 24 VOICE: I don't know if this helps, the 25 order was issued on August 15th granting the severance.

1	SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: Yeah, that's fine. I
2	was just trying to remember where we were in discovery or
3	the question of pharmacists because I know they had been
4	named, but and it doesn't make sense to me to have
5	depositions either before or during trial. And I think
6	that it was headed towards something like that with the
7	pharmacists.
8	THE COURT: All right. I am back on one
9	more time. Can people hear me now?
10	MS. HUGHES: Perfect Judge.
11	THE COURT: We are going to have to get this
12	ending quickly because the technology is no good.
13	How long do the pharmacists want to do what
14	I just said?
15	MR. DELINSKY: Can we please have 30 days,
16	your Honor?
17	THE COURT: All right. That's so
18	that's
19	MS. HUGHES: Judge are you still on?
20	SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: He must have a bad
21	connection.
22	(Judge Polster again was disconnected, and
23	the following discussion was held:)
24	MR. FARRELL: David, this is Paul Farrell.
25	I need to make a proffer for the record to correct the

record on something that my good friend Mr. Delinsky 1 2 said. 3 SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: Are you sure you need 4 to do that, Paul? 5 MR. FARRELL: Given he has made reference to 6 a waiver issue of the Plaintiffs taking the depositions 7 of the pharmacists, I want to preserve somewhere on the 8 record that we disagree with that position. 9 SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: Okay. All right. 10 MS. HUGHES: Can we do that now, David? 11 SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: Well, I think we just 12 did. 13 Is there anything more you need to say other 14 than what you just did, Paul? 15 MR. FARRELL: I always have more to say, but 16 as long as the record is clear that we have a strong 17 position that's inconsistent with that waiver argument, 18 that's all I need. 19 SPECIAL MASTER COHEN: Okay. This really 20 was the Judge's teleconference, and I am not going to 21 take it over. I assume that he has gotten answers to 22 questions that he needed to have answered, and if he 23 didn't, we will follow up in e-mail. 24 So I appreciate everybody getting on the 25 phone together. I hope you are all staying safe and

healthy. Be careful. Thank you very much. (Teleconference concluded 3:45 p.m.) CERTIFICATE I, George J. Staiduhar, Official Court Reporter in and for the United States District Court, for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings herein. s/George J. Staiduhar George J. Staiduhar, Official Court Reporter U.S. District Court 801 W. Superior Ave., Suite 7-184 Cleveland, Ohio 44113 (216) 357-7128